The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships in Counterinsurgency

Front Cover
Cambridge University Press, 2017 M06 9
After a decade and a half of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, US policymakers are seeking to provide aid and advice to local governments' counterinsurgency campaigns rather than directly intervening with US forces. This strategy, and US counterinsurgency doctrine in general, fail to recognize that despite a shared aim of defeating an insurgency, the US and its local partner frequently have differing priorities with respect to the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Without some degree of reform or policy change on the part of the insurgency-plagued government, American support will have a limited impact. Using three detailed case studies - the Hukbalahap Rebellion in the Philippines, Vietnam during the rule of Ngo Dinh Diem, and the Salvadorian Civil War - Ladwig demonstrates that providing significant amounts of aid will not generate sufficient leverage to affect a client's behaviour and policies. Instead, he argues that influence flows from pressure and tight conditions on aid rather than from boundless generosity.
 

Contents

The Trouble with Allies in Counterinsurgency
13
Influencing Clients
53
Americas Boy? The Philippines 19471953
85
The Political Effort 19511953
131
The Puppet That Pulled Its Own Strings? Vietnam
144
The Lesser of Two Evils? El Salvador 19791992
213
Conclusion
289
Bibliography
314
Index
341
Copyright

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About the author (2017)

Walter C. Ladwig III is an Assistant Professor in the Department of War Studies at King's College London and an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, London. His work has appeared in International Security, the Journal of Strategic Studies, and Small Wars and Insurgencies, as well as The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal.

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